Time to Get Rid of Mr. K, See P. 4

Believe It or Not: Secretary Gates Explains How We Might "Win" A Nuclear War, See Page 3

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On the Senate's U-2 Inquiry, and Mr. K's Tantrums

Q. *What do you think of the Senate's U-2 investigation?*

A. It would be unfair, certainly before the final report is made by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to call it a white-wash. A better term would be a *minute-wash,* like those into which busy motorists dash. Four top officials zipped in and out in four days for a quick lather. The one who came out best was Allan Dulles of CIA since nobody knows what he said, proving that silence is golden, and censorship (if you can get away with it) almost as good.

Q. *What do you think it proved?*

All You Need to Push Is A Button

A. That our government is a triumph of automation. You push a button and the huge machine keeps moving even though the driver falls asleep, or even passes away. One of the mysteries the Senate inquiry failed to penetrate is who *was* in charge of the U-2 operation. Mr. Herter, who is Secretary of State, said he had only advisory power. So did Mr. Gates, who is Secretary of Defense. Mr. Dulles leaked stories to favored newsmen saying he was ready to take the blame, but none of the versions which describe how the U-2 flights came to be stopped mention Mr. Dulles. In one version (Hagerty's) the President gave the order to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In another Mr. Eisenhower gave the order to his White House aide, General Goodpaster, while talking with Mr. Herter and Mr. Gates *after* a meeting with the super-duper National Security Council, which is supposed to keep tabs on such matters but (according to Mr. Herter) did not discuss it. (What *does* the NSC discuss? The World Series?) In none of these versions does Mr. Dulles figure, though this was supposed to be a CIA operation.

Q. *Assuming that the U-2 was not operated by interlopers from outer space, who do you think ran it?*

A. The Air Force. The Air Force was flying reconnaissance before the U-2. The chronology of the U-2 as published by *Aviation Week* May 16 indicates that the U-2 development was an Air Force development. NASA and CIA were used as covers but Air Force pilots were assigned to man the planes. Air Force intelligence men had "liaison" with CIA in supervising the spy flights. The mapping of Soviet targets is a major function of Air Force Intelligence, which seems to be both highly competent and properly secretive, judging by its achievements in long-range detection of Soviet nuclear tests. It is hard to believe that Air Force Intelligence would be willing to leave its target finding to CIA, an agency which is regarded in Washington as a medley of much too talkative Ivy League dilletantes, Russian-reading eggheads whose highly classified scholarly studies nobody but themselves seems to read and screwball adventurers in the field, some of them castoffs from more choosy and less free-spending intelligence services. The U-2 was not a cloak-and-dagger operation.

Our Own Air Law View of U-2 Flights

"The U.S. has never in fact recognized any top or upper limits to its sovereignty . . . the U.S. has never considered that it is limited in the protection of its security interests to the air space above our territory and territorial waters. For example, we have established coastal air defense identification zones extending 200 and even 500 miles from our shores although our territorial sea is only three miles in breadth."

—Loftus Becker, then The Legal Adviser of the Dept. of State, writing in the February 1959 issue of "JAG", Journal of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, a special issue devoted to a symposium on space law. This was called to our attention by Bernard B. Fall, Associate Prof. of International Relations, Howard University.

At that time the U-2 flights had been going on for three years.

Q. *Whom should the Senators have questioned?*

A. The men in actual charge of the operation, both here and in the field. Every experienced reporter knows you have to get into the bowels of a bureaucracy to know what is really going on. The men at the top sign papers, appear at Congressional hearings, rush off to cocktail parties, see visitors who can't be shaken off and pose with visiting Boy Scout delegations. They (and we) are lucky if they have time to glance at the newspapers; Mr. Eisenhower told us recently at press that *he* only reads them on Sunday. The U-2 story broke on a week day.

Q. *What are the important gaps left by the Senate investigation?*

A. One of the most important is the question of whether U-2 flights were ever suspended in the past for political reasons. The replies by Secretary Gates proved as unsatisfactory as those by Secretary Herter which we discussed last week. Three moratoriums have been mentioned by reporters with access to official sources: the first during the 1956 Suez crisis (Chalmers Roberts, *Washington Post,* May 27); the second during Mr. Khrushchov's visit (Hanson Baldwin, *New York Times,* May 30); the third, a cut-off before the summit (also Roberts). Secretary Gates didn't know of any moratorium on U-2 flights during the Khrushchov visit but added "I don't know precisely whether during that period we made any flights." Now *Newsweek* reports (June 13) that the President had "personally suspended U-2 spy flights" several times in the past. "One suspension," it said "lasted several months.

(*Continued on Page Two*)

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(*Continued from Page One*)

The President had serious misgivings about the wisdom and safety of the flights, a very highly placed source reveals. Each time CIA and Pentagon persuaded him to change his mind." If these highly placed sources can talk to reporters, why not to Senators?

How Macmillan Handled Aerial Reconnaissance

Q. *How did the British handle these flights?*

A. In this *Weekly* (May 23) I quoted a passage from the debate in the House of Commons May 11 when a Laborite asked about a report in that day's newspapers that the RAF had participated in aerial reconnaissance "until 12 months ago" when the Prime Minister stopped them. The government's spokesman refused, in line with "accepted practice" to discuss such matters in public. I have since located the press report referred to. It was an article by the Defense Reporter of the London *News Chronicle* and it said the Prime Minister had stopped such flights after his visit to Moscow a year ago and had now reiterated the order "on an 'ignore it at your peril' basis." The *News Chronicle* said Macmillan was "impressed by the fact that this mission was undertaken without President Eisenhower's knowledge and is determined that the same thing shall not happen here." This indicates a salutary awareness of the fact that military and intelligence subordinates may sometimes act on their own. This whole question deserved a more searching examination by the Senate committee if only to inhibit irresponsible provocations in the future.

Q. *What did you have in mind when you said the Senators should have questioned the men in the field as well?*

A. All the evidence indicates the U-2 was forced down by some kind of malfunction before it was hit by shrapnel from a rocket that exploded nearby. What caused this malfunction? Who was responsible for making sure the plane was in good condition? Sabotage is a distant possibility, but ought not to be dismissed out of hand without investigation. I think Congressman Pucinski of Illinois was right when he suggested in a speech to the House June 3 that a joint committee "bring back to the United States every individual who had anything to do, directly or indirectly, with the U-2 operation at the base from which Powers took off." He wasn't interested "in the self-serving statements" of those at the top "if for no other reason than because I fear that they did not really know what goes on at the lowest echelons."

Q. *What does Mr. Pucinski suspect?*

A. "It is entirely possible," Mr. Pucinski told the House, "that while pilot Powers himself might have been a dedicated servant of his Government, his airplane could have very easily been so rigged as to go down at the appropriate time over Soviet territory and conveniently fall into Soviet hands . . . when one of our American commercial planes goes down over friendly foreign territory, all of the other agencies move in —the CAA [Civilian Aviation Administration], the FBI and the various other agencies—to ascertain if there was any sabotage. Yet, I cannot see any record anywhere of any investigation being made of the airbase from which this U-2 craft left to determine whether or not there was any evidence of collusion or carelessness."

Who Stood to Benefit by Sabotage?

Q. *Who stood to gain by sabotage?*

A. Either the Soviet Union, which could thus capture the plane and compromise future flights, or those forces in our own military-intelligence bureaucracy which were opposed to relaxation of world tension and stand to benefit in the shape of bigger appropriations from the Summit breakdown.

Q. *Who else benefitted by the Summit collapse?*

A. Adenauer and the West German military.

Q. *What evidence is there of that?*

A. I call attention to an Associated Press dispatch from Paris which few papers seemed to use but which was printed in the York, Pa., *Gazette and Daily* May 20. It quoted "a high official inside NATO" as saying that Allied officials in view of the summit conference breakdown planned to ease existing restrictions on German rearmament, restrictions originally "designed to bar runaway rearmament." Five days later

Always Something Going On

"Well, I, of course, knew of the date of the summit meeting and if I had had a strong conviction about it, I would have said it, even though I didn't have the responsibility for the decision. I was in an advisory capacity, but I believed that there was really no good time to stop the collection of information. There is always some international conference or something."

—Secretary Gates to Senator Hickenlooper, at the U-2 inquiry, Senate Foreign Relations Com., June 2.

That Pre-Summit Alert: Was It Prudence, Provocation or Muscle-Flexing?

Senator MANSFIELD: Now, at the time you issued your alert [the night before the summit meeting in Paris] . . . did you have any information that Soviet forces were massing or mobilizing?

Secretary of Defense GATES: No, sir. . . .

Senator HICKENLOOPER: Do you believe that in view of the general tensions that exist and the rather jingoistic statements, let's say, that have been emanating from the Kremlin from time to time, that it was a beneficial thing to do to have this air alert as not only a show of strength but as an assurance to our friends and allies over the world that we had a readiness capability?

Secretary GATES: I do. . . .

Senator AIKEN: Mr. Secretary, at the time you ordered the communications alert on May 15th, did you have any apprehension at any time that the Communists might be considering or planning surprise action in any part of the world?

Secretary GATES: No, sir . . . I did not anticipate a surprise attack. I didn't order that kind of alert. . . .

Senator FULBRIGHT: Do you think that [alert] might have been construed as a povocative act under the circumstances that then existed in Paris?

Secretary GATES: No, sir, it was made after midnight on Sunday night. It was not intended nor was it worded as a provocative message. The first word in it was "quiet" and the last words in it were "minimum need to know" . . .

Senator FULBRIGHT: I didn't mean you intended it as such. Don't you think reasonable people might have regarded it as a provocative act?

Secretary GATES: I think reasonable people would have regarded it as a prudent act.

—Before the U-2 Inquiry, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 2.

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the UPI reported from Bonn (*Washington Post* May 26) that West Germany was stepping up its rearmament efforts and planned among other things to build submarines three times larger "than the restrictions laid down in postwar agreements with the Western powers."

Q. *What could the Senate committee do about this?*

Adenauer's Key Role

A. The U-2 incident must be seen in perspective to understand why it proved so fatal to the summit conference. Ever since the Macmillan visit to Moscow, Adenauer has done his best to shut every door the British Prime Minister opened on possibly fruitful areas of negotiation. Every suggestion for disengagement, for the thinning out of troops in Central Europe, has been turned down by Adenauer because it would be an obstacle to unrestricted German rearmament. The most fruitful recent idea was for a deal whereby the Russians would withdraw their demands on Berlin if we would limit German rearmament, particularly in regard to nuclear weapons. This was reported in considerable detail by B. J. Cutler of the New York *Herald-Tribune* in a dispatch from Paris dated April 9 (*Washington Post,* April 10). Mr. Cutler said Chancellor Adenauer "would certainly regard" any attempt to freeze the Bundeswehr forces as "discrimination against his country, which he has long opposed."

Q. *What was Adenauer's pre-summit strategy?*

A. To harden the American attitude to the point where we would deny Mr. Khrushchov even the face-saving interim agreement on Berlin he may have needed to satisfy his critics in the Kremlin. The Germans, like our military, prefer to see the "hards" back in power in Moscow because that would end the "danger" of relaxation of tension. The U-2 incident was a godsend from this point of view and it is significant that West Germany's is the one government involved which has not taken steps to stop such flights in the future. According to the Gates testimony, Wiesbaden, Germany, was one of the five airports used by the U-2. A dispatch from Bonn in the *Baltimore Sun* June 3 about the West German refusal to answer a protest from Moscow said Bonn "holds the view, though it is not broadcast, that the troop stationing agreement between the U.S. and West Germany gives the U.S. the right to conduct on or from West German soil whatever maneuvers it deems necessary for the defense of the West." That is deliberately provocative.

Esprit de Corps

Senator MORSE argued that we ought to make it clear that there would be no more U-2 flights in view of the Russian threats to bomb the bases from which they came; speculated that this threat might reflect the views of a Russian "preventive war group"; said we are dealing in Russia with "amoral" military leaders [as contrasted with the devout in our own Pentagon?]; and suggested that "a group of desperadoes such as I think the Russian military leaders are . . . might start a nuclear war for lack of appreciation for the value of human life."

Secretary GATES, gallantly: "But basically military men are conservative, worldwide, and basically are well informed in military matters, and therefore the military in the Soviet Union know better than the political leaders that they will be lost and slaughtered and devastated in a nuclear war."

—At the Senate's U-2 Inquiry, June 2.

Strategic Missiles for the Reich

Q. *What do you see as the objective of West German policy?*

A. To increase tension to the point where its new Army can acquire weapons which will enable it to act independently of NATO and therefore to deal independently from its own "situation of strength" with Russia. As this is written a dispatch from Bonn in the *New York Times* June 8 says West Germany's Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss left for the United States "to look into the prospects of acquiring long-

(*Continued on Page Four*)

Gates Sure We Can Win A Nuclear War If We Get That "Equation" Right

Senator MORSE: The President the other night in his speech to the nation indicated very clearly that a nuclear war would produce devastation upon all participants. Going back to my hypothetical question, assuming that we should fly a spy plane out of some foreign base and assuming that the Russian Air Marshal makes good on his threat and strikes that air base with Russian missiles and starts a general war, do you think we could win it?

Secretary GATES: Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE: You think we could destroy Russia and have enough of the United States left so that we could remain a power?

Secretary GATES: Yes, sir, because in this case he would, initiating this attack, give considerable warning to our retaliatory forces and with that warning, we would move in.

Senator MORSE: Your view, then, is that the United States could win a nuclear war?

Secretary GATES: If it started under those circumstances.

Senator MORSE: Do you think that the Russian military are aware of the fact that we could win a nuclear war if they started that war simply by sending a missile to one air base from which a spy plane might fly?

Secretary GATES: I think they are well aware of it.

Senator MORSE: Do you think, then, that if he kept his threat of sending a missile to a foreign air base from which a spy plane might be flown, he probably would go much further than that and send missiles elsewhere, and if he knows it is going to lead to a general war, start a general war?

Secretary GATES: I think he would have to.

Senator MORSE: In your opinion could we win that war?

Secretary GATES: Well, we could do what we call in the military, prevail in general war, but there would be great damage to the United States.

Senator MORSE: There would be terrific mutual destruction in a general war?

Secretary GATES: Yes, terrific damage.

Senator MORSE: Therefore—

Secretary GATES: But everything depends, Senator, on a lot of factors. If you vary any part of the equation, you vary the answer. In other words, time of warning, reliability of missiles, ability to fire a salvo of missiles worldwide against deployed and U.S. forces at home and abroad. These factors and the accuracies of these weapons—any other piece of this equation varies the answer.

—Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 2.

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Russia's Promising New Arms Plan Buried in Mr. K's Clowning

(Continued from Page Three)

range strategic missiles." Long-range strategic missiles are prime weapons of offense and would give Bonn the power to threaten destruction of Russia and to initiate World War III independently of our wishes. Such weapons would enormously enhance Germany's power to blackmail both sides, wringing new concessions from the West on the threat of a new deal with Moscow, and with military power enough to buy a new Russo-German alliance—as Hitler did—at the expense of Poland. One must never forget that the basic aim of Adenauer policy is to restore the 1937 boundaries.

Good Advice From Lyndon

Q. *Do you think Khrushchov is acting wisely in this situation?*

A. No. I'm no admirer of Lyndon Johnson but he had some good advice for the Soviet Premier in a speech he made in the Senate June 3. "It is the custom of those skilled in statecraft," said the Senator, reflecting his own rich experience as a politician, "to avoid unforgivable words and irretrievable acts." Mr. Khrushchov, as he showed in East Berlin, is avoiding the latter but not the former. He is acting without the dignity the head of a great state should show and without the caution the precarious state of the world demands. What he says of Mr. Eisenhower is largely true, but he is saying it with a violence and vulgarity which makes future negotiation more difficult even with his successor and he is making it difficult for Americans to wage a debate on the subject. The events of the past few weeks have revealed an appalling incompetence at the top echelons of our government, which seems to be run by second and third raters, and these events have also seriously undermined confidence in our government's spokesmen. The restoration of faith in their word should be the prime task of a new Administration but how discuss these matters calmly when Mr. K. carries on as he does?

Q. *Maybe it's time for a change in the Kremlin?*

A. The Russians say they still want a nuclear test agreement: this demands confidence and delicate negotiations. How can they be achieved in this atmosphere? They have just presented a new disarmament program that offers impressive possibilities for lifting mutual fears from the world. It has been blanketed by Mr. Khrushchov's clowning and vituperation at his Moscow press conference. They dwell on the dangers of nuclear war, but talk with amazing irresponsibility of unleashing rockets against any future flights, brushing over the possibilities of error, the difficulties of identifying just what bases they came from, the price this would exact. Neither a new U-2 nor West Berlin nor any other question in the world today is worth mutual extinction. Yet Khrushchov and Malinovsky begin to sound as wacky about war as the Chinese Communist leaders and some of our own Pentagon strategists. (See Gates testimony in the box at the bottom of page three.) We think it the duty of world statesmen to talk softly in this powder magazine our planet has become. Mr. Khrushchov for all his gifts is too much the primitive for this delicate situation. We'd like to see him retired for a wiser man. *Noon, June 8.*

Nuclear Tests May Be Resumed Secretly

"Washington prepares to revive nuclear arms tests if Geneva talks break down. Test ban negotiations resume today. Herter aids are hopeful but are sure of nothing. If Russia torpedoes chances for agreement, new weapons tests could start within months, either openly or disguised as detection research. [Emphasis added.] Nevada sites are ready now. Military men are eager to check safety, effectiveness of Polaris, Minuteman missile warheads.

"Any blasts would be small, underground. There would be no fallout to arouse public concern. U.S. scientists believe Russia couldn't tell whether explosions or earthquakes caused resultant shock waves. Americans insist international detection research blast salready planned won't involve weapons. But they concede a military by-product is possible—progress on 'clean' small weapons for battlfield use."

—Washington Wire, Wall St. Journal, May 27.

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